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Abstract
Prior research conceptualised action understanding primarily as a kinematic matching of
observed actions to own motor representations but has ignored the role of object informa-
tion. The current study utilized fMRI to identify (a) regions uniquely involved in encoding the
goal of others’ actions, and (b) to test whether these goal understanding processes draw
more strongly on regions involved in encoding object semantics or movement kinematics.
Participants watched sequences of instrumental actions while attending to either the
actions’ goal (goal task), the movements performed (movement task) or the objects used
(object task). The results confirmed, first, a unique role of the inferior frontal gyrus, middle
temporal gyrus and medial frontal gyrus in action goal understanding. Second, they show
for the first time that activation in the goal task overlaps directly with object- but not move-
ment-related activation. Moreover, subsequent parametric analyses revealed that move-
ment-related regions become activated only when goals are unclear, or observers have little
action experience. In contrast to motor theories of action understanding, these data suggest
that objects—rather than movement kinematics—carry the key information about others’
actions. Kinematic information is additionally recruited when goals are ambiguous or
unfamiliar.
Introduction
Action goal understanding lies at the heart of social interaction. Understanding why people
behave as they do allows one to attribute mental states to them, predict what they will do next,
and to coordinate one’s own behaviour with theirs [1–3]. Humans make such inferences read-
ily and fluently, even though goal information is often not directly available from the stimulus
and requires going beyond the information given, often several steps into the future (e.g. that
grasping a cookie ultimately serves the goal of eating, [4]). Since the discovery of mirror neu-
rons in the premotor and parietal cortices of the macaque, it has been argued that the human
capacity to derive such task goals may rely on a process that ‘directly matches’, based on
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available kinematic information, the observed action to an action in their own motor reper-
toire, allowing it to be identified and its goal to be derived [4–6]. However, even though it is
now clear that human action observation similarly engages neuronal ensembles involved in
action execution [7–12], attempts to link these activations to goal understanding have been
less successful [13]. A growing number of studies link action understanding to regions outside
the classical parietal-premotor “mirror” networks, such as the medial prefrontal cortex, the
superior temporal sulcus, or the posterior temporal lobe (e.g. [14–17], for meta-analysis, see
[18]). Since then, research interest has shifted towards characterizing this extended “action
observation network” rather than the core mirror regions alone. Even key proponents of the
mirroring view now agree that mirroring may be only one of several action understanding
mechanisms [19–20], while others suggest it to be a secondary step after initial goal inferences
have been made, for example, to verify that the predicted action is indeed occurring [21–23].
This raises the question on what, if not motoric information, could action goal understand-
ing then be based? Recently, we and others (e.g., [23–27]) have argued that objects would play
a major role. The effective use of objects is a defining feature of human action. From early on,
humans represent objects teleologically, not only in terms of how they have to be used, but
also in terms of their function: the goals that can be achieved with them [26–30]; for a review,
see [31, 32]. A tap, for example, is for getting water, a hammer is for driving in nails, and a
credit card is for paying. This knowledge about functional object use is supported by dedicated
(and evolutionary recent) brain systems in the left hemisphere, spanning prefrontal, parietal
and occipitotemporal cortices [33–34]. Lesions to these areas not only impair knowledge of
how objects have to be manipulated for successful action [35] or how they can be mechanically
combined with one another [32], but also knowledge about the goals they help to achieve—
what the objects are ‘for’ [35–36]. We [23] and others [22, 25, 27] have argued that this func-
tion knowledge could make a major contribution to action goal identification, in many cases
over and above kinematic or motor information. Consider the actions of inserting a letter into
a letterbox or inserting a credit card into a cash machine. The actions’ kinematics are virtually
identical in both situations, and only indicate, perhaps, that an act of insertion takes place.
Knowledge about the objects’ function, however, provides direct access to the task goals that
could be achieved in the two situations (in adults: [23, 37], children: [26–27]). In such object-
based views of action understanding, kinematic or motor information would only come into
play after such initial goal inferences have been made, allowing observers to ascertain which of
several possible actions with an object is currently carried out ([23, 25, 38]; for similar argu-
ments, see [21–22]).
The current study was designed as a direct test of these object-based views of action goal
understanding. Prior research has suggested that, when stimuli and tasks are well controlled,
there is little overlap between understanding higher level action goals and the classical premo-
tor-parietal “mirror” networks [14–15]. Object-based views of action understanding predict
instead that the brain regions recruited during action goal identification should overlap to a
large extent with brain regions involved in object identification and encoding of object seman-
tics. Here, we therefore directly compared, for the first time, goal identification with kine-
matic/motor processing of the action on the one hand and object-based processing on the
other, within the same study and using identical stimuli. We tested which brain regions are
uniquely involved in action goal understanding, and which ones are shared with either object
or motor/kinematic processing.
Participants watched videos of a wide variety of everyday object-directed actions. Their task
was manipulated to engage either brain regions involved in movement, object or goal identifi-
cation, while visual stimulation was kept identical. First, the movement task was designed to
specifically engage regions involved in the motoric/kinematic representation of actions.
Goal Understanding and Object Knowledge
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Participants were instructed to track the kinematics of the hand movements involved in the
action and—in order to ensure that they actively engaged with this task—to press a button on
the rare occasion (5.5% of all movies) that two consecutive actions involved the same hand
movements (e.g., screwing in a light bulb, screwing a lid on a bottle). To ensure goal or object
processing would not incidentally contribute to the task, movement repetitions always
involved different objects as well as goals and participants were told that they could ignore
these action aspects. Second, the object task was designed to activate regions involved in object
identification and the representation of object semantics. Participants pressed a button in the
rare case (5.5% of movies) that two actions involved the same type of object. To ensure that the
object task would only require object identification—and not goal or movement processing—
participants were told to ignore these action aspects and object repetitions always involved dif-
ferent movements and different goals (e.g., spoon used to sprinkle sugar on a cereal, to stir cof-
fee). Third, and finally, the goal task was designed to engage regions involved in action goal
understanding. Participants responded whenever two consecutive actions satisfied the same
goal (e.g., illuminating a room by pressing on a light switch, or by opening the blinds, again
5.5% of cases), while ignoring object and movement repetitions.
Similar 1-back designs have been used before to ensure participants maintain continuous
attention on relevant task aspects (e.g., various localiser task, e.g., [39–41]) and reliably sepa-
rate the brain regions associated with different task components (see [42] for a meta-analysis
in the domain of working memory). Here, this design allows us to test, first, whether there are
regions uniquely involved in encoding action goals, rather than the movements performed or
the objects used. Such regions should be more strongly activated in the goal task than in either
object and movement task. Identifying such regions is important because prior studies search-
ing for regions involved in action goal identification typically only controlled for one of the
two factors—object or movement—but not both, and object semantic tasks in particular typi-
cally activate similar regions as action understanding tasks (e.g. inferior frontal and middle
temporal regions), raising the possibility that goal activations actually reflect object processing
for example.
Second, and more importantly, this design allows us to directly test to what extent goal
understanding involves—next to regions uniquely sensitive to action goals—brain regions
involved in either object or kinematic processing of the actions, or both. To the extent that
goal understanding is based on motoric matching (as proposed by mirroring approaches), the
goal task should share activation with the movement task, when object processing is con-
trolled. Conversely, if the goal task draws upon object knowledge (as proposed by object-based
models of action understanding), then it should share activation with the object task (if move-
ment processing is controlled), specifically temporal and inferior frontal regions typically
involved in processing information about object semantics or function. After the experiment,
all participants rated the actions they saw with regard to (a) how apparent the goal was, and (b)
how much experience they had with the actions. These ratings allow us, to parametrically link,
on single subject level, identified activations to their subjective “meaning” of the participant.
Method
Participants
Fifteen students at the Plymouth University (4 males, mean age = 25, SD = 7.5, right handed,
with normal vision) provided written consent to take part in the experiment. They were rec-
ompensed £8 per hour, plus a flat fee (£14) for travel expenses. The study was approved by
Plymouth University’s Faculty of Health and Human Sciences Research Ethics Committee
prior to data collection. Sample size was determined by prior studies in the field using similar
Goal Understanding and Object Knowledge
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700 January 12, 2017 3 / 21
paradigms (e.g., [38]). One participant was excluded because she reported after scanning that
she had misinterpreted one of the tasks. Exclusion/inclusion of this participant does not quali-
tatively alter the results.
Stimuli
48 different movies (duration 3 seconds each) made up the stimulus set (see supplementary
materials). All showed common everyday instrumental actions that were carried out with the
hands. The actions were selected such that no other effectors were involved. Moreover, all clips
were shot such that the immediate action goals were achieved within the clip. For example,
scraping egg on to a plate supports the goal of transferring egg and the higher-level goal of pre-
paring lunch. However, only the low-level goal of egg transfer is fully achieved by the presented
action. The 48 actions were subdivided such that there were 8 pairs (16 movies) of actions that
involved the same movement in each pair, while goals and objects were different (e.g., screw-
ing in a light bulb, screwing the lid of a jar). In another 16 movies, the tools used in each pair
were of the same type, while goals and movements differed (e.g., using a spoon to stir, using a
different spoon to sprinkle sugar). In the last remaining 8 pairs, the actions in each pair sub-
served the same goal, while the movements and objects used were different (e.g., paying with a
credit card, paying with paper).
Tasks
There were four tasks, which varied between blocks, and which were assumed to preferentially
engage regions involved in processing the three main action aspects (see Fig 1). First, in the
‘goal task’, participants had to press a button when two consecutive actions subserved the same
goal (e.g., paying by inserting a credit card, or paying by giving money), but to ignore repeti-
tions of movements or objects. Goals were defined as the immediate action goals that would be
achieved by the presented actions. Second, in the ‘movement task’, participants responded
when two consecutive actions were presented that involved the same manual movements (e.g.,
screwing in a light bulb, screwing on a lid of a bottle), but ignored repetitions for objects and
goals. Third, in the ‘object task’, participants responded when two actions involved the same
general type of object (e.g., using a spoon to stir or to sprinkle sugar on cereal), but ignored
repetitions of goals or movements. In both the object and movement task we ensured that the
tasks did only draw on processing of object and movement information, not on action goal
information. Thus, in each object repetition, the objects were used for different goals and
manipulated differently, and in movement repetitions, the movements were performed to
achieve different goals and involved different objects. Finally, the ‘passive viewing task’ served
as common baseline for the three tasks. Here, participants merely observed the clips and did
not respond. Please note that each task was performed on exactly the same 48 action clips. Any
differences in brain activity must therefore be due to task rather than stimulus differences.
Procedure
Before entering the scanner, participants were shown an example of a mini-block (consisting
of 4 clips) for each experimental condition (goal, object, and movement) and asked to report
where, if at all, the repetition occurred. A repetition was placed within each example but its
position in the sequence varied. All participants detected all repetitions.
Participants then performed 6 scanning runs of the experiment, with the order being coun-
terbalanced across participants. Each run started and ended with 15 seconds of blank screen
(not analysed), and consisted of 25 mini-blocks, each 15 seconds long. The first and every
fourth mini-block thereafter was the ‘passive viewing’ (baseline) task. The three mini-blocks
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between these baseline blocks always contained all three experimental conditions (movement,
object, goal). Their order was pseudo-randomised, such that each possible order of the three
tasks (movement, object and goal) occurred equally often in each scanning run.
At the start of each mini-block, a 2000ms instruction informed the participant about the
relevant type of repetition that they had to report (e.g. same bodily movement, same object,
same goal or just observe/baseline). Then four clips were shown, each lasting three seconds.
The instruction remained on the screen underneath each clip. Participants pressed a button as
soon as they noticed a relevant repetition. A mini-block ended with one second of blank
screen, resulting in a total block duration of 15 seconds.
The order of clips was pseudo-randomized such that each of the 48 clips was presented
twice throughout each scanning run (twelve times for the whole experiment), and occurred
equally often in each task. The repetitions that participants had to detect were rare (5.5% of the
movies in each task) and served as catch trials. Each of the 24 different repetitions occurred
only once throughout the experiment and equally often in each task (8 goal, 8 object, 8 move-
ment). Repetitions were organised such that none of the goal tasks contained movements or
objects repetitions, none of the object tasks contained goal or movement repetitions, and none
of the movement tasks contained object or goal repetitions. The order of the two clips in each
repetition was counterbalanced across participants, so that half the participants saw them in
one order and the other half saw them in the opposite order.
Fig 1. Behavioural task. Figure 1 presents a schematic image of the behavioural task. The left hand side of the image illustrates the (fully
counterbalanced) sequence of the mini-blocks/tasks across a run (passive viewing baseline, object task, movement task and goal task). On the right, an
example of an experimental mini block for each condition is depicted. Note that the image with a red border within each mini-block illustrates a repetition
for that condition (e.g. a repeated object, movement or goal).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.g001
Goal Understanding and Object Knowledge
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After the experiment, all participants filled out two questionnaires, one measuring how
often they had performed each action and one measuring how apparent the goal of each action
was (see also [38, 43–44]). For each of the 48 actions, a representative still frame was shown
next to a seven point Likert scale. For the questionnaire measuring goal apparentness, they
noted how apparent the goal of the action was on a 7 point Likert scale, anchored with “not at
all” and “very clear” at the two ends. For the questionnaire measuring sensorimotor experi-
ence, they indicated how often they had previously performed this action, anchored by “not at
all” and “very often”.
Data acquisition and analysis
Data was acquired on a 1.5T Phillips MRI scanner, equipped with a parallel head coil. An
echo-planar imaging sequence was used for functional imaging (time repetition (TR) =
3000ms, time echo = 45ms, flip angle = 90˚, and field of view = 240, 34 axial slices, 96 x 96 in-
plane matrix, 3.9mm slice thickness). Functional data was recorded with 2.5 x 2.5 x 3.9 mm, 0
mm gap, resolution and resampled to isometric 3 x 3 x 3 mm voxels with trilinear interpola-
tion. The whole of the cortex and large parts of the cerebellum were scanned. BrainVoyager
QX 2.4 was used for pre-processing and statistical analysis. Functional data was motion and
slice time corrected and low-frequency drifts were removed with a temporal high-pass filter
(0.006 Hz.). Runs with residual motion artefacts were not considered for analysis (less than 8%
of the data). A Gaussian kernel (6-mm full width at half-maximum) was used to spatially
smooth the data. Functional data was manually co-registered with 3D anatomical T1 scans
(1 x 0.9 x 0.9 mm resolution). The anatomical 3D scans were transformed into Talairach space
and the parameters for this transformation were subsequently applied to the co-registered
functional data.
In order to generate predictors for the multiple regression analyses, the event time series for
each condition were convolved with a two gamma HRF (onset of response and undershoot, 5s
and 15s respectively, undershoot dispersion 1, response to undershoot ratio 6). Four predictors
of interest were created, three to model the three experimental conditions (Object, Movement
and Goal tasks) and one to model the button presses of the participants, capturing the explic-
itly detected repetitions in each task and the associated motor responses. Voxel time series
were z-normalized for each run, and additional predictors accounting for baseline differences
between runs were included in the design matrix. The regressors were fitted to the MR time
series in each voxel. All reported whole-brain analyses were initially thresholded at p< .005,
and whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons using Brain Voyager’s cluster threshold
estimator plug-in. This uses a Monte Carlo simulation procedure (1,000 iterations) to establish
the critical cluster size threshold corresponding to a family-wise alpha of 0.05 corrected for the
whole brain. Only clusters exceeding this threshold are reported.
For the parametric trial-by-trial analyses, the data from the post-scan questionnaires were
used to correlate, in separate analyses, brain activity in the experimental tasks to both the
apparentness of the goal in each action and how often the actions had been performed, on a
single subject level. Some participants had notified us that they found a very small number of
actions hard to identify visually, and that they had indicated this by very low ratings on the
apparentness questionnaire. We therefore excluded, on a single subject basis, ratings for
actions, which were over 3 standard deviations below the mean rating of each action for this
participant. This led to the exclusion of less than 3% data points for the parametric analyses,
from both the ‘apparentness’ and the ‘how often performed’ questionnaire.
Each subject’s remaining ratings was then utilized to construct eight parametric predictors
for the event series. To this end, each participant’s ratings of the 48 actions were transformed
Goal Understanding and Object Knowledge
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700 January 12, 2017 6 / 21
to z-scores. Eight predictors were then created, for each participant separately, each modelling
parametrically the z-transformed ratings for either goal apparentness or sensorimotor experi-
ence, separately for each of the four tasks (object, movement, goal, baseline). We chose eight
regressors to model these ratings in a task specific way, because it is likely that the two action
aspects—sensorimotor experience and goal apparentness—are differentially relevant in differ-
ent tasks. As these predictors were statistically independent of one another they can be effec-
tively combined to for maximum power to identify variations that are constant across tasks for
a fully corrected whole brain analysis, but also interrogated separately to find potential task-
specific effects (in a more restricted region of interest analysis, based on the regions identified
in the statistically independent main analysis). Additional predictors for the different mini
blocks (goal, object, movement) were added to model any overall differences between tasks,
and another additional predictor was used to model responses to the excluded items.
Results
Behavioural data
For analysis of response times, we calculated, for each participant and each task, the average
time it took participants to identify a relevant repetition, relative to the onset of the repeated
movie. Trials with negative response times or below 200 ms. (indicating a false alarm to a prior
movie) were excluded. A three-level repeated measurements ANOVA (goal, movement,
object) did not reveal any significant differences, F[2,26] = .677, p = .506 (Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected). Participants took similar amounts of time to identify movement (M = 1591 ms.),
object (M = 1647 ms.), or goal repetitions (M = 1516 ms.), arguing against different perceptual
strategies or attention sets across tasks.
Accuracy data confirmed this interpretation. We first tested whether participants were gen-
erally more likely to respond in one of the tasks (irrespective of whether the sequence con-
tained a repetition or not). We calculated the relative frequency of button presses in each
condition, across the analysed scanner runs. Numerically, participants, on average, made
slightly more button presses in the movement task (M = 37%) than the goal (M = 32%) and
object tasks (M = 32%), but this difference was not significant, F[2,26] = 2.513, p = .120. Sec-
ond, to test whether the conditions differed in the ease with which a repetition could be
detected, we calculated each participant’s ability to detect a repetition as the difference between
the percentage of trials in which a repetition was correctly detected (‘hits’) and the percentage
of trials in which participants falsely reported a repetition (‘false alarms’). Numerically, the
increase in button presses for sequences with a repetition relative to sequences without a repe-
tition was higher in the goal (M = 73%) than the movement (M = 69%) and object tasks
(M = 60%), but these differences were not significant, F[2,26] = 1.643, p = .215, arguing against
systematic differences between the tasks.
fMRI main contrasts
To ensure that our movement and object tasks indeed replicated the expected activations, we
directly contrasted activity in both tasks against one another (see Table 1, Fig 2, panel B). As
expected, the movement task activated regions typically found in action observation/mirror
neuron studies, such as the inferior parietal lobe/supramarginal gyrus bilaterally and the right
superior and inferior frontal gyri, as well as motion and body sensitive regions in the posterior
temporal lobe [45–46]. In contrast, the object task activated a number of left hemispheric
regions found in object semantics tasks, such as the inferior, middle and superior frontal gyri,
as well as areas in the middle temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus. In particular, we replicate the
Goal Understanding and Object Knowledge
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Table 1. Pairwise comparison of the goal, movement and object task.
Contrast Comparing Object and Movement tasks
Region (BA) R/L x,y,z t mm3
Object > Movement Cerebellum R 27,-79,-30 7.70 3024
Middle Temporal Gyrus/Superior Temporal Sulcus (21) L -60,-37,-2 7.51 2727
Angular Gyrus (39) L -30,-65,32 6.17 2295
Fuisform Gyrus (37) L -27,-37,-17 4.74 1728
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (47) L -50,34,-5 11.19 1485
Parrahippocampal Gyrus (30) L -11,-49,5 5.93 1458
Inferior Parietal Lobe (19) R 31,-69,41 6.41 1404
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (10) L -42,49,0 6.29 1242
Middle Frontal Gyrus (9) L -51,18,26 5.06 1188
Superior Frontal Gyrus (8) L -12,38,52 4.64 999
Middle Occipital Gyrus (18) L -29,-87,2 4.78 756
Movement > Object Inferior Parietal lobe /Supramarginal Gyrus (40) R 60,-44,23 6.28 2376
Inferior Parietal lobe /Supramarginal Gyrus (40) L -59,-40,35 5.42 1971
Middle Temporal Gyrus (37) R 52,-55,-2 4.93 1728
Middle Occipital Gyrus (19) L -51,-68,-5 6.13 1620
Cerebellum R 21,-44,-34 5.40 864
Superior Frontal Gyrus (6) R 17,-9,70 4.99 837
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (46) R 49,30,11 4.67 756
Contrast Comparing Goal and Movement tasks
Goal > Movement Middle Temporal Gyrus/Superior Temporal Sulcus (21) L -60,-42,-1 10.11 11502
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (47) L -48,31,-4 13.24 10476
Superior/Medial Frontal Gyrus (9) L -14,48,31 7.43 6021
Angular Gyrus (39) L -35,-64,31 6.60 4833
Cerebellum R 18,-69,-29 6.17 3348
Posterior Cingulate (30) L -11,-55,11 7.34 1755
Posterior Cingulate (31) L -12,-49,28 6.12 1620
Fuisform Gyrus (37) L -29,-39,-18 6.07 1404
Medial Frontal Gyrus (10) L -5,50,-4 8.12 1296
Medial Frontal Gyrus (6) L -6,3,60 7.48 1242
Cerebellum R 36,-60,-29 7.17 783
Superior Frontal Gyrus (10) R 31,50,13 5.49 783
Fusiform Gyrus (37) R 18,-42,-8 4.65 702
Movement > Goal Inferior Temporal Gyrus (37) R 46,-69,1 8.61 4968
Inferior Temporal Gyrus (37) L -44,-68,-1 9.50 4077
Inferior Parietal Lobe (40) L -50,-39,33 5.56 3672
Superior Parietal Lobe (7) R 10,-67,44 6.44 1647
Inferior Parietal Lobe /Supramarginal Gyrus (40) R 57,-36,37 5.03 1188
Middle Frontal Gyrus (46) R 43,32,16 5.57 1080
Superior Parietal Lobe (7) L -20,-67,43 5.04 891
Inferior Parietal Lobe (40) R 36,-46,53 5.28 783
Contrast Comparing Goal and Object tasks
Goal > Object Inferior Frontal Gyrus (45) L -53,21,5 6.36 4320
Middle Temporal Gyrus (39) L -48,-58,13 4.99 2403
Superior Frontal Gyrus (6) L -6,-4,62 9.56 2349
Anterior Cingluate Gyrus (32) L 0,26,24 4.92 1242
(Continued )
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distinction between the left and right premotor cortices being primarily involved in object or
movement representation, respectively [47].
Having established that the object and movement tasks activate typical regions for move-
ment and object representation, our first goal was to identify regions selectively involved in
encoding action goals rather than object semantics or movement kinematics. We therefore
ran a conjunction analysis to find regions with stronger activation in the goal task than
either the movement or object tasks (goal > movement \ goal > object). This analysis
revealed three left hemispheric regions, the inferior frontal gyrus, middle temporal
Table 1. (Continued)
Object > Goal Superior Parietal Lobe (7) R 28,-65,49 7.07 5562
Superior Parietal Lobe (7/19) L -26,-69,31 6.80 2997
Inferior Temporal Gyrus (37) L -48,-67,-4 5.66 2160
Lingual Gyrus (18) L -2,-86,2 5.34 1971
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.t001
Fig 2. Unique goal activations & pairwise comparisons of goal, movement and object tasks. Panel A
shows unique activation in the goal task (green), as well as activation shared between goal task and object task
(blue). No activations were shared with the movement task. Panel B to D show pairwise comparisons of the
three tasks. Panel B: Object task (blue) vs. Movement task (red). Panel C: Goal task (green) vs. Movement
task (red). Panel D: Goal task (green) vs. Object task (blue). All activations thresholded at p < 0.005 and whole-
brain corrected to a familywise error p < 0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.g002
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gyrus/superior temporal sulcus and the medial frontal gyrus, which were specifically
involved in the goal task relative to both, the movement and object task (see Fig 2, panel A,
green, Table 2).
Our second goal was to establish whether the goal task, next to these uniquely activated
regions, would additionally recruit object and movement selective regions. We therefore
tested, in separate conjunction analyses, to what extent the goal task shared activations with
either the object or movement task. First, to find overlapping activation with the object task,
we calculated the conjunction of regions that were more strongly activated in object than the
movement task and more strongly activated in the goal than the movement task (goal > move-
ment \ object > movement). This contrast therefore identifies shared activation of the goal
and object tasks while movement processing is controlled. It revealed that core regions of the
object network identified in our study were also activated in the goal task: the middle temporal
gyrus/superior temporal sulcus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the cerebellum (Table 2, Fie 2 –
panel A, blue). Thus, goal and object task share overlapping activation, as predicted from
the idea that action goal identification draws upon information about object function (e.g.,
[22–23]).
The opposite conjunction, identifying regions more activated in the goal and movement
tasks relative to the object tasks (goal > object \movement > object), did not reveal any sig-
nificant activation. This indicates that the goal task does not activate any of the regions
engaged by the movement task, when object-related activations are controlled. To further con-
firm this interpretation, we conducted a whole-brain direct comparison of the goal task with
the movement task. Indeed, relative to the goal task, the movement task showed a relative de-
activation of the premotor/parietal movement identification regions, as well as the posterior
temporal regions implicated in the visual analysis of motion (see Fig 2, panel C). Thus, while
the goal task draws upon regions involved in object representations, the core nodes of the clas-
sical action observation/mirror network identified by the movement task are less in activated
in the goal task.
Whole brain parametric analysis of subjective action ratings
The data from the post-scan questionnaires were used to correlate, on a single subject level,
brain activity to the individual subjects’ ratings of the apparentness of the actions’ goals and
Table 2. Conjunction analyses. Shared and unique activation in the goal task.
Contrast—Unique activation in the goal task (Goal >Movement ∩Goal >Object)
Region (BA) R/L x,y,z t mm3
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (45) L -51,23,6 6.37 2889
Middle Temporal Gyrus/Superior Temporal Sulcus (22) L -58,-42,3 4.02 648
Medial Frontal Gyrus (6) L -5,2,61 5.86 567
Contrast—Shared activation of goal and object task (Goal >Movement ∩Object >Movement)
Region (BA) R/L x,y,z t mm3
Middle Temporal Gyrus/Superior Temporal Sulcus (21) L -60,-37,-2 6.95 2403
Cerebellum R 24,-76,-26 4.92 1566
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (47) L -48,30,-2 8.58 1485
Middle Frontal Gyrus (9) L -39,8,37 4.42 675
Angular Gyrus (39) L -33,-64,34 4.89 594
Contrast—Shared activation of goal and movement task (Goal >Object ∩Movement >Object)
no activations passed whole brain-correction
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.t002
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the amount of sensorimotor experience they had with them (see Fig 3, Table 3). We first con-
ducted a whole brain (corrected) analysis in which the results for goal apparentness and senso-
rimotor experience were collapsed across tasks (goal, object, movement, passive viewing) for
maximum power. The analysis of goal apparentness revealed two regions in the right medial
frontal gyrus, which were more activated the more apparent the goal of the presented actions
was. Conversely, eight regions were activated more strongly for actions with non-apparent
goals. They overlapped with regions identified by the movement task, such as the inferior pari-
etal lobe/SMG bilaterally, as well as other motor and sensory areas such as the right precentral
and postcentral gyrus, and visual areas such as the right occipitotemporal area, and the left
fusiform gyrus and insula. Movement related regions therefore become activated specifically
for actions in which the goals were less apparent.
Correlations with ratings for sensorimotor experience revealed a similar pattern. They
revealed positive activations in two regions in the left hemisphere, the fusiform gyrus and the
parahippocampal gyrus, suggesting that these regions are activated in response to actions that
have been performed often. Negative associations were again found in regions identified by
the movement task, such as the bilateral inferior parietal lobe activation, as well as the precen-
tral gyrus of the right hemisphere, the fusiform gyrus bilaterally, the right insula and the left
inferior and medial frontal gyri.
Region of interest analysis of subjective action ratings
The whole-brain analysis has suggested that regions involved in the motoric or visual analysis
of action kinematics are recruited to a stronger extent when actions are unfamiliar or their
Fig 3. Parametric activations. Shows brain regions showing associations with the participants’ subjective action ratings. Top panel: negative
associations with the apparentness of the action goals. Lower panel: negative associations with the amount of prior sensorimotor experience with the
actions. All activations thresholded at p < 0.005 and whole-brain corrected to a familywise error p < 0.05.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.g003
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goal is unclear. The same findings emerge when the parametric analyses are computed specifi-
cally for the regions of interest (ROIs, 15 mm cubes centred on the peak voxel) derived from
the main contrast of movement vs. object task, which indexes the hypothesis-relevant regions
involved in the motor/kinematic representation of action (see Supplementary Materials for
results for regions derived from the other contrasts). Importantly, the increased power from
the ROI analysis allows us to compute these comparisons for each of the four tasks separately
(goal, movement, object, passive viewing). Because participants saw each action equally often
in each task, the regressors for the subjective ratings used in this ROI analysis were statistically
independent from the regressors used in identifying these regions, precluding artefactual infla-
tion of statistical power due to non-independence (i.e. double-dipping, [48–49]).
This analysis revealed, averaged across all ROIs identified by the movement task, significant
negative relationships between goal apparentness and sensorimotor experience specifically in
the goal task (and the passive viewing task), but less so in the object and movement task
(Table 4, bottom row). These negative relationships specifically for the goal task were also found
when these relationships were tested for each region separately (Table 4). A 2 x 4 x 7 ANOVA
with the factors rating, task and region revealed (greenhouse-Geisser corrected) main effects of
task, F(3,39) = 3.25, p = .041, region, F(6,78) = 4.07, p = .009, as well as an interaction of region
and rating, F(6,78) = 2.90, p = .036, showing that the different regions within the movement-
related network responded differently to the two ratings, and that responses were most pro-
nounced in the goal (and passive viewing) task compared to the object and movement tasks.
These findings therefore show that regions involved in the kinematic/motoric analysis of actions
are activated in the goal task, but particularly when goal identification is difficult, because
Table 3. Whole brain activations varying parametrically with subjective action judgments.
Contrast Region (BA) R/L x,y,z t mm3
Apparentness of action goal
Positive associations Medial Frontal Gyrus/Anterior Cingulate (32) R 4,43,-4 6.34 1323
Medial Frontal Gyrus (10) R 8,59,15 5.12 567
Negative associations Fusiform Gyrus (37) L -45,-63,-11 6.46 1782
Inferior Parietal Lobe (40) L -51,-36,34 6.04 1431
Superior Parietal Lobe (7) R 12,-59,47 6.18 1809
Occipitotemporal area (37) R 51,-63,-7 5.87 1026
Precentral Gyrus (6) R 51,-1,31 5.31 864
Postcentral Gyrus (2) R 47,-27,33 4.63 837
Insula (13) L -44,-7,7 5.07 648
Inferior Parietal Lobe (40) R 37,-43,47 4.43 567
Sensorimotor experience
Positive associations Fusiform Gyrus (37) L -27,-43,-10 4.57 1026
Parahippocampal Gyrus (19) L -17,-54,-4 8.27 972
Negative associations Inferior Parietal Lobe (40) R 58,-27,23 7.72 3645
Fusiform Gyrus (37) L -45,-61,-10 7.24 2565
Inferior Parietal Lobe (40) L -57,-27,34 7.44 2511
Fusiform Gyrus (37) R 42,-52,-8 5.24 1431
Insula (13) R 34,-1,13 5.71 918
Precentral Gyrus (6) R 24,-16,55 4.98 810
Medial Frontal Gyrus (6) L 0,-19,48 5.35 675
Inferior Frontal Gyrus (9) L -51,2,22 4.93 567
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.t003
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observers have little experience with the actions that are unfamiliar or actions whose goals are
unclear.
Discussion
Previous research has largely ignored the role of the objects and conceptualised action goal
understanding primarily as a kinematic matching of observed actions to own motor represen-
tations. In contrast, our new data reveal that, at least for the everyday instrumental actions
investigated here, action goal identification is more closely aligned—and shares large scale acti-
vation—with the processing of object semantics and function, instead of kinematic/motor pro-
cessing. Indeed, our data suggest that the classical premotor-parietal “mirror” networks and
temporal visual motion sensitive regions play a secondary role in action goal understanding
and are recruited specifically when actions are unfamiliar or their goals are not clear.
Participants watched everyday instrumental actions and identified, in different tasks, either
the movements performed (movement task), the objects used (object task), or the actions’
goals (goal task), while visual stimulation was kept identical. We tested, first, whether there are
regions uniquely involved in action goal understanding, compared to both, motor/kinematic
or object processing of the actions. Indeed, three left hemispheric regions—the inferior frontal
gyrus, the middle temporal gyrus and the medial frontal gyrus—showed such a role, showing
stronger activation in the goal task than in either the movement or objects tasks. Our data
therefore confirms the proposed central role of these regions in action goal identification [12,
15, 50–51]. In addition, contra motoric theories of action understanding, they show for the
first time that this role cannot be simply reduced to a motoric/kinematic (or object-based)
encoding of the actions, instead revealing unique processes during action goal identification.
Second, and more importantly, our study revealed that, to derive these goals, the brain
draws primarily on object-related information, rather than motor/kinematic information.
Recall that the object task was designed to specifically recruit regions involved in object identi-
fication, not in the processing of body movements or the goals achieved with them. And
indeed, relative to the movement task, it activated the expected network of left prefrontal and
middle temporal regions previously implicated in encoding object semantics [31, 35, 52–53].
Importantly, the same regions were also activated when the goal task was compared to the
Table 4. Parametric regions from Movement task. Parametric trial-by-trial analyses of subjective action ratings (Exp., sensorimotor experience with the
actions; App., apparentness of action goals), for each of the regions identified by the movement task (relative to the object task). The values show average
across-participants beta values reflecting the relationship between individual participants’ ratings of the actions and brain activation while observing them in
the four tasks.
Task Movement Object Goal Passive V.
Region App. Exp. App. Exp. App. Exp. App. Exp.
Inferior Parietal Lobe R (40) .05 .02 -.03 .01 -.04 -.05 -.06 -.01
Inferior Parietal Lobe L (40) -.10 -.12 -.01 -.11 -.19 -.18** -.19** -.28***
Middle Temporal Gyrus R (37) -.15** -.15 -.13 -.19* -.27** -.32*** -.28*** -.31**
Middle Occipital Gyrus L (19) -.08 -.05 .05 -.17 -.17*** -.28** -.29*** -.36***
Cerebellum R -.04 .07 .00 -.00 -.08 -.11 .05 .06
Superior Frontal Gyrus R (6) -.00 .00 .07 -.00 -.19* -.19** -.11 -.09
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R (46) .01 -.02 -.09 -.03 -.12 -.27*** -.07 -.05
Overall -.04 -.04 -.02 -.07 -.15* -.20*** -.14*** -.15**
* p < .10,
** p< .05,
*** p < .01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.t004
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movement task, demonstrating that goal understanding draws upon the same pre-frontal-tem-
poral networks as object identification in the object task, in line with recent proposals that
objects, because they are associated with specific functions, provide direct information about
the goals that can be achieved with them [23, 25, 38]. In sharp contrast, testing for shared acti-
vations of goal and movement task revealed no such commonalities. Even though the move-
ment task (relative to the object task) activated the classical set of “mirror” regions in premotor
cortex and parietal lobe, as well as inferior temporal motion selective areas (for a review, see
[54]), these regions were not found to be activated when the goal task was compared to the
object task. In fact, direct comparisons revealed that these movement representation areas
were less activated in the goal task than the movement task. Thus, while the goal task activates
regions involved in object identification, it does not activate the motor/kinematic region net-
works engaged by the movement task.
These data are in line with prior reports noting an absence of classical mirror-like activa-
tions in higher-level goal understanding tasks (e.g., [14, 15]), and reveal for the first time that
object identification—rather than motor or kinematic information—might provide the central
input to goal inference processes. Note that the object task was explicitly designed to not
require motor behaviour as a source of information, and that classic mirror or motion sensitive
regions were relatively de-activated in the goal task. The contribution of object knowledge to
goal identification is therefore unlikely to be motoric in nature. Instead, the overlap between
the object and the goal task is consistent with the proposal that goal identification could specif-
ically draw upon function knowledge about objects, such that knowledge about what an object
is “for” can give the observed action its meaning [23, 25, 27, 38, 43, 26].
What, then, is the role of the classical ‘mirror’ regions? Our parametric analyses confirm
that these regions do play a role in action goal understanding, but that they are recruited spe-
cifically when goal identification is difficult, when actions are unfamiliar and their goals are
not clear. We correlated activity while viewing the different actions with participants’ ratings
of how apparent their goal was and how much sensorimotor experience they had with them.
Motoric matching theories predict that mirroring regions are specifically engaged whenever
actions are familiar and can be matched to an action in one’s repertoire (e.g., [55]). However,
in these studies, goal understanding was not required by the task and the actions did not
involve objects, and therefore measured automatic responses of the mirror/motor system to
the actions of others. Here, we found the reverse: when the goal of the action was clear and
familiar, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and parahippocampal gyrus, regions associated
with mentalizing and memory became activated [56–57]. In contrast, premotor and parietal
“mirroring” regions were specifically active when participants watched either unfamiliar
actions or the action’s goals were ambiguous (for similar results, see [38, 44]). These results
therefore confirm (1) that mirror and motion selective regions do play a specific role in action
goal understanding, but (2) reveal that this contribution specifically concerns actions for
which goals are not clear or unfamiliar. In addition, (3) focussed region of interest analysis tied
these negative relationships directly to the goal task, not the motor task. The observed relation-
ships are therefore unlikely to reflect automatic resonance of the motor system with familiar
actions, but instead reflect a secondary recruitment of mirror and motion selective regions
when action goals are task relevant but cannot be reliably inferred [38, 43]. Our findings are
therefore in line with recent suggestions that these regions are not the primary driver of action
goal attribution, but play a disambiguating or compensating role, for example, when action
goals are unconstrained because object information is missing [24], when multiple actions
(and goals) are possible in the given object context [25], or when visual input is uncertain,
either due to ambiguous action input or disruption of visual processing itself [58, 59].
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Together, these data support previous arguments for a hierarchical model of action under-
standing [22, 23, 60], in which different action aspects—objects, movements, goals, and associ-
ated mental states—are represented separately (Fig 4). They specifically support models that
argue for a major influence of object information in action goal understanding [23, 25, 27].
Such models suggest that for the type of instrumental action investigated here, potential action
goals are initially derived from object function information, which, as found here, is localised
to temporal and the inferior frontal regions (Path 1 in Fig 4). If a goal cannot be identified,
because the actions are ambiguous or unfamiliar, premotor and parietal ‘mirror’ networks, as
Fig 4. A simple model of everyday action understanding. Potential goals are initially identified on the basis of object information in inferior
frontal and middle temporal areas (Step 1). Parietal-premotor motor-representation regions verify this initial interpretation or provide additional
information (Step 2). If a goal is identified, associated mental states can in turn become activated—via medial prefrontal areas—and integrated
with the situational context or prior knowledge about the person (Step 3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0169700.g004
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well as motion selective regions in the inferior temporal lobe, are recruited (Path 2). They pro-
vide a more detailed kinematic description of the movements, for example, to verify that the
movements performed indeed conform to the assumed action goal, and that this goal will
most likely be achieved [21, 25, 38, 43]. Finally (Path 3), the identification of a likely action
goal allows for the action to be integrated with the situational context or with knowledge about
the other person’s intentions, via medial prefrontal ‘mentalizing’ regions found in our study
and others [14, 15].
While prior work has focussed on motor processes during action observation, more recent
studies have started to delineate how objects constrain and guide action observation [22, 23],
biasing perceptual processes [61], motor responses [1] and brain activations towards the
expected action [25], as well as allowing different goals to be attributed to observed actions,
even when the movements performed are identical [43, 45, 27]. Our new results are in line
with these findings by showing direct overlaps between action goal understanding and the pro-
cessing of object function and semantics. An open question is to what extend the current
results generalise to other actions. Our set of actions was randomly selected from frequent
actions of everyday life, with the only constraint that repetitions of objects, movements and
goals across actions were controlled. It is therefore unlikely that the effects reflect specific pro-
cesses associated with these particular actions. However, actions from other domains might
differ in the extent to which they involve objects (jumping, scratching oneself, waving) and
sometimes the relevant objects might not be visible (pantomimed actions, point light figures,
objects hidden behind an occluder). These cases are likely to increase the requirement for
accurate motor/kinematic action representations (for a review and theoretical view, see [23]),
and further research needs to disentangle how the availability of object information constraints
motor processes in a dynamic fashion [24, 25].
Similarly, the results will depend on the level of goals that is targeted. Action goals can be
conceptualised in a hierarchical manner [18, 21, 60], where higher level task goals (e.g. turning
on a light) depend on lower level motor goals (pressing down on a switch). The goals we inves-
tigated here were those higher-level task goals which describe “why” of an action [18]. Because
such goals are often fully achieved only at the end of the action, or require further steps, they
are typically more abstract and observers need to go beyond the information given by the
stimulus to infer them [62]. Our data suggest that objects make a unique contribution here,
probably because people learn from a very young achieve which function each object has and
therefore which of these overarching goals it can help to achieve [23, 26]. The understanding
of lower-level goals, in contrast, may depend to a larger extent on the specific motor and kine-
matic features of the movements on which they causally depend. Indeed, recent meta-analyses
suggest that while over-arching task goals (the why of an action), like the ones studied here,
activate similar inferior frontal and temporal regions as in our study, the tracking of more
lower level motor goals relies more directly on motor-related regions in premotor and particu-
larly parietal cortex [18, 51].
Another question is what types of processing the current activations reflect. On the highest
level, the regions reflect the global requirements of the tasks to identify (and keep in working
memory) the objects involved, coarse action kinematics and their goals. However, this might
involve both regions for representing these action components, but also regions required to
guide attention to these aspects, for example, tracking of motion in the movement task, and
more static object-related processes in the object task. While our study was designed to test
these global overlaps between tasks, such more specific distinctions between the roles of the
different brain areas is subject to further research. Newer neuroimaging analysis methods such
as repetition suppression and multivariate procedures [10, 12] will be able to provide direct
information about these questions.
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Conclusions
We demonstrated a clear anatomical separation within the action observation network,
between regions engaged in encoding the goal of an action on the one hand, and regions
encoding the movement and objects on the other. We also demonstrate that, while goal pro-
cessing is therefore strongly interwoven with object processing, movement-specific processes
are only engaged in cases when the goal is unclear or participants have little experience with
the observed actions. This does not rule out that actions are recognized if they can be matched
to an action in one’s repertoire. However, it suggests that, for the perception of everyday
object-directed actions, this matching process may occur primarily on the basis of the objects
used rather than on the basis of kinematic information. These findings have direct implica-
tions for recent theories of action understanding and observation. Firstly, they highlight a left
hemispheric frontotemporal (rather than frontoparietal) system in extracting action goals,
which supports recent modelling work [22]. Secondly, they emphasise the role of visual cues,
such as objects, rather than motor information, for the first step of action goal identification,
as proposed by recent theories [23, 43]. Finally, it suggest kinematic action representations in
parietal and premotor ‘mirror’ regions of the brain are not the main carrier of goal informa-
tion, but that they are recruited by an alternative route if object information is diminished,
perhaps to verify initial goal assumptions [21, 38, 43].
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